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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
1.

Should Retherford!s request to create a public policy

exception to the at-will doctrine for a termination based on
alleged sexual discrimination and retaliation be denied where the
Utah Legislature has enacted the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act to
provide a comprehensive and exclusive mechanism for remedying
unlawful

discrimination

and

retaliation?

reviewable under the correctness standard.

This

issue

is

Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
2.

Should Retherford1s request to create a cause of action

for wrongful termination in violation of public policy be denied,
where Retherford1s employment was not "at-will" but could be
terminated

only

for

just cause pursuant

to the collective

bargaining agreement, and where Retherford has a remedy for a
termination

in violation of public policy pursuant

exclusive and mandatory

to the

grievance and arbitration procedure

contained in the collective bargaining agreement?
reviewable under the correctness standard.

This issue is

Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).

3.

Does the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's

remedy" provision contained

"exclusive

in U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(11) preclude

Retherford's claims where those claims are based on alleged
sexual discrimination and harassment and on alleged retaliation
for resisting sexual discrimination and harassment?
is reviewable under the correctness standard.

This issue

Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
Are Retherfordfs claims against Appellees preempted by

4.

federal labor law where her claims are substantially dependant
upon an analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement?
standard.

This issue is reviewable under

the correctness

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669

(Utah 1989).
5.

Is Retherford barred by federal law from bringing this

action against Appellees where she failed to exhaust her remedies
under

the collective bargaining agreement, and, if not, are

Retherford's
limitations
claims."

claims

applicable
This

standard.

barred

issue

to

by

the

"hybrid

six-month

301/fair

is reviewable

under

statute

of

representation
the

correctness

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669

(Utah 1989) .
6.
breach

Are Retherford's
of

implied

claims for negligent

contract, and

intentional

employment,

infliction of

emotional distress barred by the statute of limitations where
this action was filed more than four years after the events which
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give

rise

to those claims first occurred?

reviewable under the correctness standard.

This

issue is

Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).
7.

Has Retherford

failed to state a claim against the

individual Appellees for intentional infliction of emotional
distress?

This

standard.

issue is reviewable under

the

correctness

Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669

(Utah 1989) .
8.

Has Retherford

failed to state a claim against the

individual Appellees for malicious interference with contractual
relations?
standard.

This issue is reviewable under the correctness
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669

(Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Appellees believe that this Court's interpretation of Utah
Code Annotated

§34-35-7.1(11) will be dispositive of certain

issues in this case.

That statute provides:

The procedures contained in this section and Section
34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law for
employment discrimination because of race, color, agef
religion, national origin, or handicap.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 7, 1989.
[R. 2.]

Retherford's complaint alleges claims against AT&T for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of
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implied

contract, and negligent employment, and against the

individual Appellees for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and interference with contractual relations.
On June

1, 1989, Appellees

Retherford's complaint.

[R. 47.]

filed a motion

to dismiss

Following the submission of

memoranda and affidavits by the parties, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, District Judge, issued a Minute Entry, dated September
5, 1989, which indicated that he had treated the motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and had granted the
motion

in its entirety

memoranda

"for

the reasons specified

in support thereof."

[R. 318.]

effect was signed by Judge Frederick.

in the

An Order to that

[R. 324-25.]

Retherford's

appeal is from that Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
operator

Retherford

was

initially

employed

as a telephone

by Mountain Bell in Grand Junction, Colorado.

In

February, 1983, Retherford transferred to Mountain Bell's Wasatch
office located in Salt Lake City, Utah.

[R. 4, 1110.] On January

1, 1984, Retherford was transferred from Mountain Bell to AT&T as
part of the nationwide divestiture.
2.

[R. 142, 114.]

While Retherford was employed by Mountain Bell and

AT&T, she was a member of the Communication Workers of America
and worked under, and was subject to the terms and conditions of,
a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the union and
her employer.

[R. 142, 113.]
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3.

The collective bargaining agreement prohibits AT&T from

unlawfully discriminating against any employee because of the
employee's sex.

[R. 156, 112.2.]

It also prohibits the dismissal

of an employee without just cause.

[R. 160, 11 6.2(b)(3).]

It

further provides a mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure
to resolve employee disputes.
4.

[R. 157-162.]

In May, 1984, Retherford made a formal complaint to

AT&T's internal EEO office, claiming sexual harassment by Jolene
Gailey.

[R. 86.]

AT&T's EEO office conducted an investigation

into the allegations and determined that there had been no sexual
harassment.
5.

In

[R. 238-39.]
August,

discrimination

with

1984, Retherford

filed

the EEOC, alleging

that

subjected to sexual harassment.

[R. 88.]

a charge

of

she had been

In February, 1985,

Retherford filed a lawsuit in federal court [the "1985 lawsuit"]
against AT&T based upon the alleged harassment.

[R. 90-96.]

AT&T's motion to dismiss the 1985 lawsuit was granted in June,
1985.

[R. 98-99.]
6.

Retherford took a disability leave of absence from AT&T

in September, 1985.

[R. 219, 1155.]

In early 1986, when she was

able to come back to work, she informed AT&T that she could not
return to work at AT&T's Salt Lake City office and requested that
AT&T transfer her to a different office.
office for operators in Utah.

[R. 143, 115.]

-5-

AT&T had no other

7.

On March 12, 1986, AT&T advised Retherford that it had

created a job for her as an operator in Boise, Idaho,

Retherford

was informed that she was required to report to the Boise office
by March 23, 1986.

On that date, Retherford failed to report to

her new job in Boise.
8.

[R. 219, 1157.]

On March 26, 1986, a letter was sent to Retherford by

AT&T, advising her that because she had not reported for work as
requested, her employment with AT&T was terminated. [R. 21.]
9.

In 1986, following her termination, Retherford filed a

grievance against AT&T pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement.

The grievance was not resolved after it had proceeded

through step two of the grievance procedure.

Retherford did not

appeal the grievance to step three and did not pursue arbitration
as provided in the collective bargaining agreement.

[R. 143-44,

116.]
10.

In

February,

1988, almost

two

years

after

her

termination from AT&T, Retherford filed with the EEOC another
charge of discrimination against AT&T [the "1988 Charge"], again
alleging that she had been subjected to sexual discrimination and
harassment while at AT&T.
filed another
against

[R. 103.]

In July, 1988, Retherford

lawsuit in federal court

Appellees

and her

harassment and retaliation.

[the "1988 lawsuit"]

union, alleging

discrimination,

In March, 1989, the federal court

entered an order granting Appellees' motion to dismiss.
113.]
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[R. 105-

11.

Retherford commenced

this action on April 7, 1989.

[R. 2.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I
A public policy exception to the at-will doctrine should be
created only where a remedy is not otherwise available for an
employee who has been terminated in violation of an important
public policy.

The Court should not create a cause of action for

wrongful discharge in this case, where Retherford's claim is
based on alleged sexual discrimination and retaliation, because
the Utah Legislature has provided in the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act a comprehensive

remedial scheme for enforcement of the

employee rights against sexual discrimination and retaliation,
which remedy is exclusive.
Point II
A cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of
public

policy

should

not

be created

in this case, where

Retherford's employment with AT&T could not be terminated except
for

just

cause, and where Retherford

termination

in violation

exclusive and mandatory

has a remedy

of public policy pursuant

for a
to the

grievance and arbitration procedure

contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
Point III
The

exclusive

remedy

provision

-7-

of

the

Utah

Anti-

Discrimination Act, U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(11)/ preempts Retherford's
claims based on employee discrimination, including retaliation.
Point IV
Actions brought under state contract law for breach of a
collective bargaining agreement are preempted by federal law.
Other tort and contract claims under state law also are preempted
where the evaluation of the claims are inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, or are substantially dependent on an analysis of the
terms of tne collective bargaining agreement.

Retherford's

claims are preempted by federal labor law.
Point V
Retherford's action is barred where she failed to exhaust
the exclusive and mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.

If Retherford

was not obligated to exhaust her contractual remedies because of
her union's negligence, she was required to bring her "hybrid
301/fair

representation

termination.

claim" within six months after her

Having failed to do so, Retherford's action is

barred by the statute of limitations.
Point VI
Retherford's claims for negligent employment, breach of
implied

contract, and

intentional

distress arose prior to August 1984.
the applicable statute of limitations.

-8-

infliction

of

emotional

Thus, they are barred by

Point VII
Retherford

has not alleged

facts

indicating

that

the

individual Appellees engaged in conduct towards her with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where a reasonable
person would have known that emotional distress would result.
The facts alleged by Retherford are not, as a matter of law, of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable.
Thus, her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
were properly dismissed.
Point VIII
Retherford has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim
for malicious interference with contractual relations.
no allegation

that

the

individual

Appellees

There is

intentionally

persuaded or conspired with another to terminate or interfere
with her contractual relations.
any

improper

purpose

or

There also is no allegation of

improper

individual Appellees.
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means on behalf

of

the

ARGUMENT
I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE FOR A TERMINATION BASED
ON ALLEGED SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION WHERE
THE UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE
AND EXCLUSIVE MECHANISM FOR REMEDYING UNLAWFUL
DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION
This Court has not recognized a cause of action under Utah
law for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Although

three

justices of the Court have

indicated

their

willingness to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine in an appropriate case,1 the Court has not articulated
the precise nature and content of such an exception or the
circumstances that would justify the adoption and application of
such an exception.
The Court should proceed with great care in recognizing
public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
771 P.2d

at 1050

(Zimmerman, J., concurring

Berube,

in the result).

Actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must
involve substantial and important public policies, which should
be narrowly construed.
plurality opinion).

Berube, 771 P. 2d at 1043 (Durham, J.,

This exception also should be recognized

only where a remedy to vindicate the public policy at issue is
not otherwise available.

Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel

1

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043
(Durham, J., plurality opinion, with Stewart, J., concurring);
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result).
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Stores, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 1185, 1193 (N.D.N.C. 1989); Crews v.
Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D. Mass. 1984).
Retherford asserts that her claim for wrongful termination
in violation of public policy is based upon the policy embodied
in the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ["UADA"], U.C.A. §34-35-1, et
seq., which

prohibits

employers

from

retaliating

against

employees for resisting sexual harassment and discrimination.
[Appellant's Brief at 26.]
included

The Utah Legislature has expressly

in the UADA a comprehensive

enforcement
retaliation.
opportunity

of employee

rights against

remedial

scheme for

discrimination

and

The UADA provides an aggrieved employee with the
to remedy discriminatory or retaliatory conduct,

first through an administrative process and thereafter by way of
judicial action.

Since the UADA grants employees a right to be

free from discriminatory and retaliatory treatment, and provides
a means whereby violations of those rights can be remedied, no
separate common law cause of action is needed to remedy any
unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
Numerous courts have found that no common law cause of
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based
upon discrimination, harassment or retaliation exists where the
state statute which prohibits such conduct also provides a
remedial scheme for vindication of the rights created therein.
See, e.g., Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985); Crews
v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 28-29 (D.Mass. 1984); Greene v.
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Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299 (D.Me. 1985).^
The courts have so ruled even though state law recognizes a claim
for

wrongful

discharge

in violation

of public

policy

in

situations where there is not a comprehensive remedial scheme to
vindicate the public policy.

Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank,

571 F.Supp. 287, 293-94 (N.D.Cal. 1983); Schroeder v. DaytonHudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910, 914 (E.D.Mich. 1978).

Similarly,

courts have refused to recognize claims for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy based on alleged violations of Title
VII because Title VII provides an adequate
wrongful termination.

remedy

for the

See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Brothers

Apparel Stores, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 1185, 1193 (N.D.N.C. 1989);
Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 993-94
(D. Hawaii 1988); Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403
(D.M.M. 1986).
There are several policy reasons why this Court should not
recognize a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy based on alleged discrimination and retaliation.

First,

the primary reason for creating such a cause of action is absent
when a statutory remedy is available.
2

The rationale for the

Other cases so holding include:
Trembath v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Wolk v. Saks Fifth
Avenue, Inc. , 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1984); McCluney v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F.Supp. 24, 26-27 (D.Wis. 1980);
Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F.Supp. 1543, 1546 (E.D.Pa. 1984),
aff f d, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,
438 F.Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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initial cases which established the public policy exception to
the traditional rule governing "at-will" employment is that a
private

remedy

should be implied

for employment

discharges

violative of public policy, when there is no other adequate
remedy

to vindicate the public policy.

Schlitz

Brewing

Co., 489 F.Supp.

McCluney v. Joseph

24, 26

(E.D.Wis. 1980).

Confronted with this "right without a remedy" scenario, courts
recognize a common law cause of action in order to fill the
legislative gap.

When a statutory remedy is available, there is

no gap and the justification for judicial creativity is absent.
Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984).
The creation of a cause of action based upon public policy
against discrimination and retaliation would interfere with the
delicate balancing of the comprehensive remedial scheme of the
UADA.

Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299

(D.Me. 1985).

The UADA reflects the Utah Legislature's balancing

of competing interests.
types of conduct.

Employees are protected against certain

Employers are protected against certain

litigation by a relatively short statute of limitations and a
mandatory conciliation process.

The appropriate remedies, as

determined by the Legislature, have been established with both
the employee and employer in mind.
3

The creation of a new cause

Retherford argues that the remedies created by the UADA are
inadequate to compensate her for the injuries she allegedly
sustained. [Retherfordfs Brief at 46-47.] Where the Legislature
prohibits sex discrimination and related retaliation in

-13-

of action would allow an employee to bypass the legislatively
mandated prerequisites for judicial relief.
Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984).

Crews v. Memorex

This Court should not

tamper with the scheme which the Legislature has established when
there is no need to do so to provide an employee who allegedly
has been discriminated or retaliated against with an adequate
remedy.

Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295,

299 (D.Me. 1985).
Creation of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy based on discrimination, harassment or retaliation
also would duplicate the remedies already provided by the UADA.
Since courts do not look with
duplicate

remedies, recognition

unnecessary

and

improper.

favor upon

the creation of

of such a claim would
Crews

v.

Memorex

be

Corp.,

588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984); Greene v. Union Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299 (D.Me. 1985). 4

employment, and creates a cause of action in favor of an employee
who has been subjected to such conduct, it is entitled to
determine the appropriate and exclusive remedies that may be
imposed if those provisions are violated.
4

The United States Supreme Court has held that the pursuit
of a Title VII claim does not necessarily preclude the pursuit of
other rights under a state discrimination statute or other
applicable state and federal statutes.
Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974). The right to pursue parallel
or overlapping statutory claims, which are not otherwise
preempted, does not constitute authority or precedent to create a
new common law remedy which interferes with the otherwise
exclusive remedial provisions contained in a state discrimination
statute.
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The courts in several of the cases cited by Retherford
relied on the following principle of law in recognizing a cause
of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy
based on sexual discrimination, harassment or retaliation:
As a general rule, if a statute which provides for
a new remedy shows no intention to negate, either
expressly or by necessary implication, a pre-existing
common law remedy, the new remedy will be regarded as
merely cumulative, rather than exclusive, with the
result that a plaintiff may resort to either the preexisting remedy or the new remedy.
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 689 P.2d
1984). 6

The

determined

courts

that

1292, 1303 (Or.

in Holien, Rojo, Merrell

common

law

causes

of

action

and

Froyd 7

for

sexual

discrimination or harassment existed under Oregon and California
law prior to the enactment of the statutory remedies for such
conduct.

Accordingly, it was held that the statutory remedies

°See also Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158, 166 (Cal.App.
1989); Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 815,
824-25 (C.D.Cal. 1989); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F.Supp 669, 674
(E.D.Cal. 1988).
'The holdings in Rojo, Merrell and Froyd are contrary to
several other California state and federal court decisions which
have addressed the issue in question.
Robinson v. HewlettPackard Corp., 183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1125, 228 Cal.Rptr. 591
(1986)(racial discrimination); Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193
Cal.App.3d 489, 238 Cal.Rptr 360 (1987)(retaliatory discharge);
Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 608 F.Supp. 1315, 1322
(N.D.Cal. 1984)(religious discrimination); Hudson v. Moore
Business Forms, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 467, 474 (N.D.Cal. 1985)(sex
discrimination). The California Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on the issue, although it has agreed to review the Rojo case.
Merrell, 720 F.Supp. at 818-19 n.l.
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misplaced.

Section 34-1-8(1)(f)f which has been recodified at

§34-20-8, is part of the chapter involving employment relations
and collective bargaining.

Section 34-4-12, which has been

recodified at §34-22-12, is part of the chapter entitled "Women
and Children—Conditions of Labor and Employment."

Neither of

those provisions prohibited sex discrimination, sexual harassment
or retaliation based thereon, or penalized an employer which
engaged in such conduct in the workplace.

A cause of action

based upon such conduct only arose as a result of the enactment
of the UADA.
This Court should reject Plaintiff's attempt to create a
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy

where

the claimed

violation

is based

upon alleged

discrimination or retaliation.
II
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION
IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT BE CREATED
WHERE RETHERFORD WAS NOT AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE BUT
COULD ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE AND
WHERE SHE HAD A REMEDY FOR A TERMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
The reasons which arguably justify the recognition of the
public policy exception in an employment at-will case do not
apply in a situation where the employee may only be terminated
for

just cause.

In an at-will employment

relationship, an

employee may be terminated with or without just cause.
employer

If an

terminates an at-will employee for a reason which
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There exists a public policy to promote industrial peace by
facilitating
policy

orderly, bilateral industrial relations.

also dictates that parties to collective

Public

bargaining

agreements resolve disputes covered by the agreement exclusively
through the agreed-upon grievance and arbitration procedures
contained in the contract.

To permit an employee covered by a

collective bargaining agreement to bring a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy is to invite strife
unnecessarily.

Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.App.3d

402, 406, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980).

The "public policy exception" to

the at-will doctrine should be tailored so as not to obliterate
other "public policies" of the state and nation, such as the
protection of orderly industrial relations.

Lamb v. Briggs

Manufacturing, a Division of Celotex Corp., 700 F.2d 1092, 1095
(7th Cir. 1983) .
State and federal policy favor the use of arbitration where
provided under a collective bargaining agreement.
§78-31a-3;

Lindon

City

v.

Engineers

See U.C.A.

Construction

Co.,

636 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah 1981); United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 564, 567, 568 (1960).
By recognizing Retherford's claim, the Court would be sanctioning
Retherford's

circumvention

of the grievance and arbitration

procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement.
The cases cited by Retherford in support of her position
overlook the specific policy reason which caused the courts to
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part of the trade-off union employees accept in exchange for the
many rights they benefit from—rights not enjoyed by employees at
will.

As part of the give and

take which exists

in the

collective bargaining process, both employers and employees give
up certain rights or benefits in exchange for other rights and
benefits.

That process is favored by both state and federal

policy, and should not be impaired by extending a "public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine" to employees who only may be
terminated for just cause and who have agreed to pursue their
claims in accordance with the remedies provided by the collective
bargaining agreement.
Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
which governed Retherford's employment, Retherford

could be

terminated only for just cause.

[R. 160, 116.2(b)(3).]

The

collective

provided

and

bargaining

agreement

a grievance

arbitration procedure to ensure Retherford relief if terminated
without

just cause.

[R. 157-162.]

If Retherford

felt her

termination was in violation of public policy, she was free to
pursue her contractual remedies8 or sue for breach of contract
under §301 of the LMRA.

The policy reasons identified above

^Retherford denies that she had a remedy under the
collective bargaining agreement.
[Retherford's Brief at 28.]
That assertion is belied by the fact that she filed a grievance
to remedy her discharge. [R. 143, 116.] It was not the lack of a
contractual remedy that prevented her from challenging her
termination, but rather her unwillingness to pursue her grievance
through all steps of the grievance and arbitration process.
[R. 143-44, 116.]
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T H E EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION O F T H E U T A H
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION A C T PREEMPTS RETHERFORD'S n.AIM^

ii

.

Jibi i nnination,

harassment

ui

;

re<aliati

.
:

uui w

sexadJ.

*e l i o n J 4 - J D , . ^

V

^,

w*. ww*- J A D A s t a t e s :

(11) The procedures contained in this section and
Section 34-35-8 a r e the exclusive remedy i inder state
law for employee discrimination because of race, color,
s e x , a ': -j r e 1 i g i o n, n a t i o n a 1 o r i q I n , o r h a n d i c a p .
[Emphr
-*dded. ]
'The

It-u M a t u r e

provided i*
I 1 i,'-'i" I II I

:

I I }!<

h a s mad*

'

• "-

'^

* :•

procedures

- M»A are the exciusivt
' "

' R e t h e r f ord * s i:e 1 i a n c e o n Petermann_ , "<
11 ite r na t i o n a 1
Brotherhood of Teamsters, e t c , 17 4 Ca 1. App 7l cT 18 4 , 344 P. 2 d ' 2 5
(1959) is misplaced. Although Petermann was a union m e m b e r , the
collective bargaining agreement which governed his employment did
not provide a remedy for the conduct by which he w a s injured.
The absence of a contractual remedy necessitated the creation of
a new cause of action.
In this case f however, Retherford not
only w a s entitled to fi 1 e a grievance regarding her termination,
5
*•
- ~ n v i red to do s o .

While Retherford concedes that the procedures set forth in
the UADA are the exclusive remedy for "employment discrimination"
pursuant to §34-35-7.1(11), she argues that the exclusive remedy
provision does not govern "retaliation".

Such an argument is

without merit.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has one provision
prohibiting unlawful discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2, and a separate
provision prohibiting retaliation against an employee who asserts
protected rights, 42 U.S.C. §20003-3. The UADA, however, defines
discrimination as including retaliation, as follows:
(1)

It is a discriminatory
practice:
(a)(i)

or prohibited

employment

for an employer to refuse to hire, or
promote or to discharge, demote,
terminate any person, or to retaliate
against, or discriminate in matters of
compensation or in terms, privileges,
and conditions of employment against any
person otherwise qualified, because of
race, color, sex, age, if the individual
is 40 years of age or older, religion,
national original, or handicap . . . .
[Emphasis added.]

U.C.A. §34-35-6(l)(a)(i).
As set forth in the foregoing statute, retaliation against
any person because of race, color, sex, age, religion, national
origin or handicap constitutes employment discrimination within
the meaning of the UADA.

Thus, the exclusive remedy provision
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emeay
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::. D a v i s v . Utah Power &< L i g h t Co. ,

~: ,.-

r

excLisivn

I

discrimindt
unwelcome

ci
mi 1
sexuaJ

advances and contact.

When she objected to the repeated advances

by the supervisor, she was coerced into signing a release of
liability and thereafter was terminated without cause.
1

at

2.]

The

plaintiff's

complaint

[Appendix

asserted

sexual

discrimination and harassment claims under Title VII and numerous
state law claims.
The defendants moved
contending
remedy

to dismiss the state law claims,

that they were preempted by the UADA's exclusive

provision.

In

interpreting

the exclusive

remedy

provision, Judge Greene stated:
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision of
the Act as only foreclosing those common law causes of
action which are based upon the very conduct which is
necessary to prove sexual harassment or sex
discrimination under the Act, namely, conduct expressly
prohibited by the Act or conduct satisfying all the
essential elements of a prima facie case. [Appendix 1
at 12. ]
Retherford's claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy is based on conduct expressly prohibited by the
UADA, and
provision.

is therefore preempted

by

the exclusive

remedy

Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract

also is essentially a claim for alleged wrongful termination
grounded in sexual discrimination and retaliation.

Because the

implied contract claim is based on the same discriminatory and
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IV

RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLEES ARE
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Conqress '

powpii

Iu

in t IMIIHJ ill

s i .il i

I i i

i'

ili»i i urnl

Ii

I".. jpL eiuaey Clause ul Ail , VI nl I lie Federal Constitution,

HI

I HIP

A JI i s-

* °In Davis, Judge Greene ruled ;>,a' t r - K,a;r-,;:t: - . ,
for breach of implied contract arising out ot an emplo\—
handbook was essentially a claim for wrongful termination
grounded in sexual discrimination and was preempted by the UADA.
[Append.! x .'" at- i" |

Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).

Congressional

power to legislate in the area of labor relations has long been
established.

Id.

While federal law does not preempt all local

regulations which touch or concern in any way the interrelationships between employees, employers and unions, id. at 208 n.4,
local regulation is preempted if it conflicts with federal law or
would frustrate the federal scheme or if the courts discern from
the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy
the field to the exclusion of the states.

Id. at 209; Malone v.

White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
A.

State Law Contract Claims are
Preempted by Federal Labor Law.

Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ["LMRA"],
29 U.S.C. §185f provides that suits for violations of collective
bargaining agreements may be brought in federal district court.
That

section

congressional
uniform

has

been

held

by

the

courts

to

reflect

a

intent to promote industrial peace by ensuring

application

of

federal

collective bargaining agreements.

law to the enforcement

of

Eitmann v. New Orleans Public

Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1984).

The federal

courts have recognized the mandate of Congress to fashion a body
of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out
of labor contracts. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 209.
The preemptive

effect

of

§301 was

first

Teamsters v. Lucas-Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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dismissed their action, ruling that those claims were preempted
by federal labor law because the evaluation of those claims was
dependent upon an analysis of the provisions of the collective
bargaining

agreement which governed the employees.

Id. at

1350.l;L
Plaintiff's reliance upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988), is misplaced.

U.S.

,

The Court in Lingle did

nothing to alter the principle set forth in Allis-Chalmers that
when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the
parties to a labor contract, the plaintiff's claim is preempted
by §301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.

Allis-

Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 200.
In Lingle, an employee brought a state court action claiming
that she was terminated for exercising rights under the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act.

The Supreme Court held that since the

application of state law did not require the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement, that application of state law
was not preempted by §301 of the LMRA.

Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at

1885.
11

Other decisions are in accord:
Olguin v. Inspiration
Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1472-76 (9th Cir. 1984);
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1350-52 (9th
Cir. 1984); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212
(9th Cir. 1980); Hohn v. Kaiser Cement Corp., 624 F.Supp. 549,
551 (D.Mont. 1986).

-30-

subbtc

; .

appendant

col l e d w e Laiguinjn'-

upc;

•jaaiye.

agreement

must u«

s

:>*

the

ten.

• therford's
Claims
Against
A p p e l l e e s Are I n e x t r i c a b l y I n t e r t w i n e d With C o n s i d e r a t i o n Of The
Terms Of The C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g
Agreement.
a..

cu-l3:

The Wrongful
Agains1 ^ v 1 '
F e d e r a ; i-a1*
w--* n~

v i O i c+-;

D i s c h a i ge C l a i m
V Preempted by
o] n

-

,i

iv n i l

i

' :a

'

: ji *i ..

. ^'L. - . ve

*

' >

'

*h -

r

eve? <
..

t 1

LDt

*u

, tcuec: in u i d i i , wo 1. * c e n s 1 it utf ,j

bar get J.: ,*^ uu.eeuie.

i. t i n ; .

*-»rminati~ r

CoJieC

. v><

b d i q d ' H J ')C

„iq:eeititM

- Aevance- «.. o-bnid

Jependehi

UJUI

c

**

IUI , rocedures. * j

1

An action based on a public poliry exception wo .*-*
will doctrine is considered an action in tort in many ..to-Justice Zimmenna*
~^ indicated that an action brought by an ^
will employee discharged i. lcjation * .mLl ,: policy W L J I J •; <
be an action in tort, bu* ...'!>•' a^ a ' . n in contract. Beru*)*: P. 2d at
c>] fZimp^rn^'
, uunuuiiinc
* * * *- — • ' - '
11
The . ,. , . - . „. gaining agreement prohibits unlawful
Jiscr iminat i.,.: tv AT*, ' :• * he has is of ..ex I *. 156^ 11?.;.] and
prohibit - * .
employee wrhout
y c cause,
[R, ifcO, 1I1D, 1|D.2ID)(J..
!• ad^p: • ie P. an for Employees'
l,
ensi::nsf Disability ^IJI ^ *
id Death B*i>rits, which cov^t
'} leaves.
It also
' I P S the requi* -^
grievance df* * * MI r.rai J on procedures "ha- n.i r.
'..Ucwi-?. *.
-31-

2.

The Breach of Implied Contract
Claim Against AT&T is Preempted by
Federal Law,
(a) The Code of Conduct does not
constitute an implied contract
between AT&T and Plaintiff.

Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract is based
upon a provision in a pamphlet known as the Code of Conduct.
provision

in question

states

that AT&T prohibits

The

sexual

harassment of its employees in any form.
An employer's policy manual may give rise to employee
contractual rights.
1033,

1044

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.y

(Utah 1989); Piacitelli

College, 636 P.2d

1063, 1066 n.5

771 P.2d

v. Southern Utah

(Utah 1981).

State

As with any

implied contract, however, whether an employer's policy manual
creates a contract turns on the intent of the parties.

See Moore

v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 642 (Utah 1986).
In an attempt to avoid preemption of her claim for breach of
implied contract, Plaintiff argues that the Code of Conduct is an
independent agreement between the parties, totally separate from
the collective bargaining agreement.

No facts are set forth in

the complaint which support the conclusory allegation.
Agreements
negotiated

between AT&T and

its union

employees

are

by AT&T with the union, which is the employee's

an employee believes that the company's actions are in violation
of the terms of the agreement. [R. 157-162.]
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exclusive bargaining agent.

[R. 154, 111.1.]

The collective

bargaining agreement which has been entered into by AT&T and the
union, on behalf of its members, "sets forth the terms and
conditions of employment applicable to all employees of the
Company for whom the Union is the recognized bargaining agent
. . . and supersedes all prior recognition and working agreements
between the parties."

[R. 154.]

The Code of Conduct is not a separate agreement between AT&T
and its employees.

It is merely an internal company document

which "sets forth basic principles to help define standards of
conduct."

[R. 225.]

encompassing.

It expressly states:

Other

company

"The Code is not all

policies,

practices

and

instructions, as well as common sense standards of conduct also
apply."

[R. 225.]

Conduct

regarding

harmony

with

agreement.

The provisions contained in the Code of
sexual harassment and

the provisions

retaliation are in

of the collective

bargaining

There is no evidence that the statement of policy set

forth in the Code of Conduct constitutes a contractual provision
between the parties, independent from the collective bargaining
agreement.
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(b) Retherford's claim for breach
of implied contract arising
out of the Code of Conduct is
dependent upon an analysis of
the collective bargaining
agreement.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act governs
claims

founded

directly

on

rights

created

by

collective

bargaining agreements/ and also governs claims "substantially
dependent

on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
(1987).

U.S.

, 107 S.Ct 2425, 2431

Regardless of whether the Code of Conduct is a separate

and independent agreement not founded directly on rights created
by the collective bargaining agreement, Retherford's claim for
breach of implied contract is preempted because it is dependent
on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement.
In order to determine whether the "exclusive agreement"
language in the collective bargaining agreement renders the Code
of Conduct merely a part of the agreement, supercedes it, or has
no effect whatsoever

on it, an analysis of the collective

bargaining agreement must be made.

In order to determine whether

an employee may or must pursue any claim for breach of the Code
of Conduct

through the grievance and arbitration procedures

provided in the collective bargaining agreement, an analysis of
the collective bargaining agreement is required.

-34-

Retherford
Williams,

relies on two cases, Caterpillar

U.S.

Corp. , 794 F.2d

Inc. v.

, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) and Malia v. RCA

909, 911 (3d Cir. 1986), in support of her

argument that her contract claim based on the Code of Conduct is
not preempted by federal law.
entered

into by employees

outside

the

bargaining

Those cases involved contracts

relating

unit.

to management

The

collective

positions
bargaining

agreements which covered their regular employment did not govern
their employment in the managerial positions.

See Caterpillar,

Inc., 107 S.Ct. at 2427; Malia, 794 F.2d at 911.
determination

Since the

of their claims for breach of the individual

contracts was not founded directly on rights created by the
collective bargaining agreement, and did not depend upon an
analysis

of, or

interfere with, the collective

bargaining

agreement, the breach of contract claims in those two cases were
not preempted.
Unlike the situation found in Caterpillar, Inc. and Malia,
Retherfordfs breach of implied contract claim is "inextricable
intertwined11 with consideration of the collective bargaining
agreement and cannot be adjudicated without reference to it.
Accordingly, that claim is preempted.
3.
Retherford

Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1885.

Retherford's Negligent Employment
Claim is Preempted by Federal Law.
claims

that AT&T

is liable

for

negligent

employment because it retained Gailey, Johnson and Randall as

-35-

employees, despite knowledge of their harassment of Retherford.
The collective bargaining agreement sets forth the grounds for
which an employee may be terminated.

It also sets forth the

procedures which must be followed in terminating an employee.
AT&T's right or obligation to terminate or otherwise discipline
Gailey, Johnson and Randall was governed by the collective
bargaining agreement.
In order to decide the negligent retention claim, it must be
determined

whether AT&T acted appropriately

Gailey, Johnson and Randall.
is

dependent

upon

in dealing with

Since the negligent retention claim

analysis

of

the collective

agreement, that claim is preempted by federal law.

bargaining
Lingle, 108

S.Ct at 1885; Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347,
1350 (9th Cir. 1985).
4.

Retherford's Claims for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress and
Malicious Interference with Contractual
Relations also are Preempted by Federal
Law.

Retherfordfs tort claims against Appellees Bateson-Hough,
Johnson

and

harassment.

Randall

are

based

upon

alleged

retaliatory

Retherford does not specify in her complaint the

acts allegedly engaged in by Johnson and Randall which constitute
harassment.

She alleges that Bateson-Hough actively supported

the harassment by instructing Retherford that if she continued to
complain about Gailey*s conduct, she would be terminated, and by

-36-

refusing to prevent the continuation of such harassment.

[R. 13,

1151.]
Retherford's emotional distress claims and interference with
contract claims arise out of her employment and discharge.
order

In

to determine the validity of those tort claims against

Bateson-Hough, Johnson and Randall, it must be determined whether
their conduct in the work place was improper, whether BatesonHough was authorized

to monitor Retherford's performance, to

reprimand or criticize her, to ask her to stop complaining or to
require her to sit at a designated work station; and whether
Retherford could have filed, or had a duty to file, a grievance
regarding

the

actions

of

the

individual

Appellees.

A

determination of the validity of those claims also requires a
determination of whether her discharge was justified under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

Those issues

cannot be decided without interpreting or analyzing the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement.

Newberry v. Pacific Racing

Assoc, 854 F.2d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 1988).
Since the evaluation of Retherford's tort claims against
Bateson-Hough, Johnson and Randall are "inextricably intertwined
with an analysis of the terms of the labor contract, Retherford's
claims

for

intentional

interference
dismissed.

infliction of emotional distress and

with contract

are preempted

and were properly

Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1327,

1352 (9th Cir. 1985).
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IV
RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE
SHE FAILED TO EXHAUST HER REMEDIES UNDER THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT ORf ALTERNATIVELY, HER CLAIMS
ARE BARRED BY THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A.

Retherford's Claims Are Barred Where She Failed To
Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies

An aggrieved employee cannot seek judicial relief against an
employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement if the
employee

has sidestepped

the grievance-arbitration

machinery

which the agreement provides as the employee's exclusive remedy.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650ir 652-53 (1965).

The

claims made against Appellees all involve matters which were
subject

to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the

collective

bargaining

agreement, and

those procedures

intended by the parties to be their exclusive remedy.

were

[R. 158,

115.5, 159, 116.1.]
Retherford

did

not

attempt

to utilize

the

machinery until after her employment was terminated.

grievance
Thereafter,

she filed a grievance but did not pursue the grievance past step
two.

[R. 143-44, 116.]

As a result, her claims for breach of

contract are barred by the exhaustion doctrine articulated in
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).

For

the same reasons, Retherford's failure to exhaust her grievance
remedies also is a bar to her tort claims against Appellees.
Dinger

v. Anchor

Motor

Freight,

(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Inc., 501 F.Supp.

64, 71

In Dinger, the court stated:
It is foreseeable and understandable that any
employee who allows unresolved grievances to accumulate
can reach a point of suffering emotional distress from
feeling that he has been wronged.
See Magnuson v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th
Cir. 1978). This does not change a contract claim into
a tort claim.
Id. Moreover, to allow him to reach
that point without submitting his grievances to the
dispute resolution machinery which the union and the
employer have chosen as exclusive, and to allow him to
proceed in court on a tort theory would deprive both
parties to the agreement of the benefit of their
bargain. This could result in making employers less
willing to bind themselves to exclusive grievancearbitration machinery, and could undermine the union's
position as collective bargaining representative.
Dinger, 501 F.Supp. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

See also Magnuson v.

Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978).
Since Retherford failed to exhaust her grievance remedies,
the district court properly dismissed her related tort claims
against Appellees.
B.

If Retherford's Claims Are Not Barred Because She
Failed To Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies, Her
Claims Nevertheless Are Barred By The Six-Month
Statute Of Limitations

Retherford

alleges

that

she

failed

to

exhaust

her

contractual remedies as a result of the union's negligence.

If,

as alleged, Retherford has a "fair representation" claim against
her union, she may bring her claims arising out of the alleged
breach of the collective bargaining agreement under §301 of the
LMRA

against

either

the

employer,

the

union, or

DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983).
action

is referred

to as a "hybrid 301/fair
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both.

This type of

representation

claim,"

amounting

settlement
agreement.'"

of

to

"a direct

disputes

under

challenge
the

to

'the private

collective

bargaining

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165.

The applicable statute of limitations for a hybrid case
under §301 is six months.

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172.

This

action was commenced after the six-month limitation period had
passed.

Thus, even if Retherford did not have to exhaust her

remedies, and even if her claims were not dismissed but instead
treated as §301 claims, those claims are barred by the six-month
statute of limitations.
VI
RETHERFORD1S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT,
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Any claim for negligent

retention or breach of implied

contract which Retherford may arguably have against AT&T arose at
the time Retherford first believed she was being harassed or
discriminated against by her co-workers.

Since any such conduct

allegedly began prior to the time Retherford submitted a written
complaint to AT&T's EEO Coordinator in May, 1984 [R. 210, 1123;
238-39], Retherford's claims for negligent retention and breach
of

implied

limitations.

contract are barred by the four-year

statute of

U.C.A. §78-12-25(2).

Similarly, the alleged conduct of the individual Appellees
which forms the basis of Retherford1s claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress commenced prior to May, 1984.
-40-

[R. 12-14.]

Those claims also are barred by the four-year

statute of limitations.
VII
RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE
INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FAIL TO STATE CLAIMS
OPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47
(1961), this Court stated that an action for emotional distress
may be maintained where (1) the defendant intentionally engaged
in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of
inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result, and (2) his actions are
of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality.
Throughout

the

complaint, Retherford

makes

numerous

conclusory statements to the effect that she was subjected to
sexual discrimination or harassment by some of her co-workers.
At no time does she allege any facts that evidence an act of
discrimination or harassment against her.
Retherford asserts, however, that her affidavit contains
allegations

of specific

facts which support her claim for

intentional

infliction of emotional distress.14

X4

None of the

Under the rules, a claim for relief shall be set forth in
a pleading, not in an affidavit. U.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
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facts asserted in the affidavit allege that Appellees engaged in
conduct

towards

Retherford

with

the purpose

of

inflicting

emotional distress or where a reasonable person would have known
that emotional distress would result.
Moreover, the facts alleged are not, as a matter of law, of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in
that

they offend against

decency

and morality.

the generally accepted standards of
In Comment

d to Section

46 of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), it states:
First, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous. The
liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or
trivialities.
"It has not been enough that the
defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or
even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by 'malice,f or a degree of aggravation
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages
for another tort. Liability has been found only where
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency * * *."
Restatement

(Second) of Torts, Sec. 46, Comment

d

(1965)

(emphasis added).
Neither

the complaint

nor the affidavit alleges acts by

Bateson-Hough that reasonably could be considered "outrageous and
intolerable."
engaged
asserts

Retherford

does not allege that Bateson-Hough

in any discriminatory conduct towards her but merely
that

she

"supported"

it or failed

to prevent

it.

Clearly, such allegations do not state a claim for outrageous
conduct.

Similarly, the alleged acts of retaliation,
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i.e.,

monitoring Retherford1s work, requiring Retherford to sit by a
co-worker, criticizing her in public, and asking her to stop
complaining, do not constitute outrageous conduct.

See Morrison

v. Sandell, 446 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ill.App. 1983).
With respect

to Johnson, Retherford does not allege any

facts which could be considered

outrageous or

intolerable.

Retherford1s affidavit only alleges one instance when Johnson
made comments directly to Retherford.

[R. 217, 1114.] Retherford

makes reference to two other statements which were allegedly made
by Johnson to another person while she was looking at Retherford.
[R. 212, 1130; 213-14, 1136.]

The only other direct contact which

Retherford claims Johnson had with her was when Appellees (and
not specifically Johnson) stared at and made "hostile facial
expressions" toward her, sat and walked near her, and talked
about her amongst themselves.
comments

5

[R. 215, 1140.]

Such alleged

and conduct, even if true, are not outrageous and

intolerable as a matter of law.
Retherford

alleges

that Randall

stated

to her

on one

occasion, "It's too bad we're being watched all the time."

[R.

"Retherford also alleges that Johnson made other sexuallyoriented comments to others which Retherford overheard, and that
Johnson engaged in other sexually-oriented conduct.
[R. 216,
1111 43-45; 218, 1149.]
Retherford does not allege that such
conversations and conduct were directed to her, made reference to
her, or were intended to cause her any distress.

-43-

219, 11 54.]

The only other conduct attributed to Randall was the

purported kissing of a co-worker, which conduct is not alleged to
have been directed to Retherford or made for the purpose of
causing Retherford any distress.

[R. 217, 1147.]

The alleged

comment and action by Randall cannot reasonably be construed as
being outrageous and intolerable.
The district court was warranted in dismissing Retherford1s
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
VIII
RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A
CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
APPELLEES FOR MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
The Utah Supreme Court in Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83,
368 P.2d 597 (1962), set forth a general description of the tort
of intentional interference with contract:
It is generally recognized in a majority of
jurisdictions that one who persuades another or
conspires with another to breach a contract is guilty
of an actionable tort, unless such persuasion or other
action causing the breach was done with just cause or
excuse.
It is also generally recognized that even
though a defendant's action brings about a breach of
contract, he is not liable where the breach was caused
by the doing of an act which he had a legal right to
do.
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d at 602.
The motive and conduct of a third party are important
considerations

in determining whether a third party has any

liability for a breach of contract by one of the parties thereto.
As stated by this Court:
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Where persons have merely pursued their own ends
without any desire or intention of causing another to
breach his contract, they should not be held liable for
the other's breach. To hold them liable for damages so
far removed from their action would amount to an undue
restraint upon their freedom to act.
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d at 603.
In

order

to

prevail

on

her

claim

for

intentional

interference with contractual relations, Retherford must prove
the following:
(1) That the individual Appellees intentionally
persuaded another or conspired with another to breach
the collective bargaining agreement which governed
Retherford's employment, or otherwise intentionally
interfered with Retherford's contractual relations;
(2) That such intentional action was for an
improper purpose or by improper means or otherwise
without just cause or excuse; and
(3) That such intentional action caused injury to
Retherford.
Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 602; Isom, 657 P.2d at 304. 16
A.

Retherford Has Not Alleged Facts
Sufficient to State a Claim Against the
Individual Appellees,

Retherford
Appellees

has not alleged

intentionally

that any of the individual

persuaded another or conspired with

16

In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982), this Court indicated that the right of action for
interference with a specific contract is but one instance, rather
than the total class, of protections against wrongful
interference with advantageous economic relations.
Isom, 657
P. 2d at 301. Thus, the Court's analysis of the tort of wrongful
interference with advantageous economic relations is applicable
to the tort of intentional interference with contractual
relations.
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another

to breach

the collective

bargaining

agreement

or

otherwise intentionally interfered with Retherford's contractual
relations.

There are no facts alleged which indicate that any of

the individual Appellees caused, or were even involved with,
Retherford's termination.
More importantly, Retherford has not alleged that any action
taken by the individual Appellees was for an improper purpose.
Improper purpose in this context has been defined by Professor
Prosser to include "a purely malicious motive, in the sense of
spite" and "a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its own
sake."

Isom, 657 P.2d at 293 [quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of

the Law of Torts, §129 at 943 (4th Ed., 1971)].

There is no

allegation to suggest that any such improper purpose or motive
existed on the part of any of the individual Appellees.
There is no allegation in the complaint that the alleged
intentional actions of the individual Appellees were by improper
means.

Acts commonly included in the phrase "improper means" are

violence,

threats,

or

other

intimidation,

deceit

or

misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation or
disparaging falsehood.
not allege

that

Isom, 657 P. 2d at 308.

Retherford does

improper means were used by the individual

Appellees to interfere with her contractual relations.
Retherford's
contractual

claim

for

malicious

interference

with

relations was properly dismissed by the district

court.
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B.

Appellee Bateson-Hough, Who at All Times
was AT&T's Managery Cannot be Liable for
Malicious Interference with Contractual
Relations as a Matter of Law,

The law is well-settled in Utah that one party to a contract
cannot be liable for the tort of interference with contract for
inducing a breach by himself or the other contracting party.
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah
1982).

Pursuant to that rule, AT&T, one of the parties to the

agreement, could not be liable for tortious interference with
that agreement.
The scope of this legal principle extends beyond the parties
to the agreement to encompass the agents of the parties also.
Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1979); Houser v. City
of Redmond, 586 P.2d 482, 485 (Wash. 1978); Salazar v. Furr's,
Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403, 1410 (D.N.M. 1986).
In Houser v. City of Redmond, 586 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1978), a
former city police officer alleged that certain fellow officers
engaged in activities constituting intentional interference with
contract.

The plaintiff argued that the fellow officers were

third parties with respect to the employment agreement between
the plaintiff and the city.

The Washington Supreme Court, in

rejecting that claim, stated:
The employees are only third parties if they were
not acting within the scope of their employment.
A
municipal corporation, like any corporation, can act
only through its agents, and when its agents act within
the scope of their employment their actions are the
actions of the city itself. [Citation omitted.] Thus,
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if Redmond's employees were acting within the scope of
their employment, their actions were Redmond1s, and no
interference claim will lie.
Houser, 586 P.2d at 485.
Bateson-Hough was the manager of AT&T's Wasatch office.
12, 1(49.]
employment.

[R.

At all times, she was acting within the scope of her
Her actions were the actions of AT&T.

As a result,

she cannot be held liable to Retherford, as a matter of law, for
interference with contractual relations since she is deemed to be
a party to the collective bargaining agreement.
Only two of the cases cited by Retherford in her brief in
support of her position addressed the issue in question.

Those

cases are not determinative of the issue in this case, where they
involved supervisory personnel who were not part of management.
Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads, Inc.,
565 A.2d 285, 290 (D.C.App. 1989); Treadwell v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 666 F.Supp. 278, 280 (D.Mass. 1987).

None

of the cases cited involved a person who held a management
position such as Bateson-Hough held with AT&T.
Since Bateson-Hough cannot be liable to Retherford for
intentional interference with contractual relations, the district
court's dismissal of this claim against Bateson-Hough should be
sustained.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein,
Appellees respectfully request that the Court affirm the order of
the district court granting Appellees' motion to dismiss.
DATED this ? ™

day of July, 1990.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.

&LiM.kL
Richard M. Hymas,'Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of July, 1990, I

served upon Plaintiff/Appellant four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, by causing the same to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard W. Perkins, Esq.
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
343 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
NICKIE LARSEN DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
EMERY MINING CORPORATION,
STANLEY A. RAJSKI,
Defendants.

Civil No. 87-C-0659G

This matter came before the court on April 6, 1988,
pursuant to defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Nickie Larsen Davis ("plaintiff") was represented by Ann Wise,
Stanley A. Rajski ("Rajski") was represented by Samuel Gaufin,
Utah Power & Light (UP&L) was represented by Paul Proctor, and
Emery Mining Corporation ("Emery Mining") was represented by
David Anderson.

The parties submitted memoranda and presented

oral argument, after which the court took the matter under
advisement.

Thereafter, counsel for the parties advised the

court that settlement negotiations were underway and that no
ruling would be required.

Following protracted settlement

negotiations and a hearing concerning such, at which plaintiff
was represented by substitute counsel, Phil L. Hansen, the matter
was again submitted for decision and a pretrial conference was
scheduled for November 14, 1988.
Being now fully advised, the court sets forth its

Memorandum Decision and Order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this Motion, defendants have stipulated
that the factual allegations in plaintiffs complaint may be
taken as true.

With this in mind, the court here reiterates the

essential allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint.
On April 2, 1986, plaintiff began her employment with
Emery Mining as a security specialist, and continued her
employment uninterrupted after April 27, 1986, when UP&L assumed
operations of Emery Mining.

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after

commencing her employment, her immediate supervisor, defendant
Rajski, began a course of sexual discrimination and harassment of
plaintiff consisting of unwelcome sexual advances and actual
sexual contact.

This included calling her at home, ordering her

to drive with him to remote rural areas, and detaining her
against her will.

Plaintiff claims that despite her repeated

rejection of the harassment complained of, such conduct was made
a condition of her employment, creating an intimidating and
hostile working environment.

On October 10, 1986, plaintiff

alleges that Rajski called her into his office, detained her, and
coerced her into signing a "settlement and release," purporting
to release UP&L, its officers and employees from claims of
discrimination and civil rights violations.

Plaintiff alleges

that she was then terminated without cause from her employment

2

with UP&L on October 10, 1986. Rajski's actions allegedly were
performed both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as
an agent for his employers, Emery Mining and UP&L.
Count I of plaintiff's complaint involves a claim
against all defendants for sexual discrimination and harassment
in violation of plaintiff's rights under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e-l to -16.1

Counts II

through X of plaintiff's complaint involve claims arising under

As a prerequisite to suit under Title VII, timely charges
must be filed with both the state agency and with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(3).
Procedurally, Title VII sets up a process by which the state may
establish an agency, referred to as a Section 706 Agency, to
process charges of discrimination alleged to violate Title VII.
If such an agency exists, the complainant must file the charge with
that agency before filing the charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(c). In Utah, the established agency is the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division, which in turn files the charge with the
EEOC. The claimant, including one who charges a violation of Title
VII, has the election of keeping jurisdiction of the case within
the Division and seeking settlement or formal hearing through the
Division as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (1953 & Supp.
1987), or requesting the Division to waive its jurisdiction, cease
administrative processing and forward the case to the EEOC for
issuance of a right to sue letter. In order to file a civil action
under Title VII, the charging party must receive or at least be
entitled to receive such a right to sue letter.
In this case, plaintiff complied with all procedural
requirements.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
complaining of sexual harassment with the Utah Antidiscrimination
Division on April 7, 1987. In response to a written request from
plaintiff's attorney, the Division wrote plaintiff a letter, dated
April 19, 1987, agreeing not to exercise jurisdiction, to refer the
charge to the EEOC, and to take no further action. Then, on April
19, 1987, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, after which all
administrative processing of the charge terminated.
3

Utah state law over which this courts jurisdiction is pendent,2
Defendants have moved for dismissal of the state law
claims on the ground that the administrative procedures of the
Utah Antidiscrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8
(1953 & Supp. 1987), ("the Act") 3 purportedly afford the
2

Specifically, plaintiff's state law claims include: breach
of employment contract (Count II), bad faith discharge or breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count III) ,
tortious discharge for violation of public policy (Count IV) ,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count
V) , invasion of privacy (Count VI) , assault and battery (Count
VII), false imprisonment (Count VIII), failure to adequately train,
supervise or control (Count IX) , and fraud and deceit (Count X) .
For purposes of this Motion, the court assumes that these claims
are asserted against all defendants despite the fact that
plaintiff's complaint does not delineate whether each of these
claims is asserted against all or only some defendants. However,
it is reasonable to conclude that the contractual claims do not lie
against Rajski because, as an employee himself, he had no contract
with plaintiff. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the
claim for failure to adequately train, supervise or control is
applicable only to Emery Mining and UP&L, as employers. It is also
logical to conclude that plaintiff is not claiming bad faith
discharge or tortious discharge for violation of public policy
against Emery Mining because she was only employed by Emery from
April 2, 1986 to April 27, 1986, when she became employed by UP&L.
Also, the claim for fraud and deceit reasonably does not lie
against Emery as it arises out of the execution and signing of the
release agreement, which occurred more than five months after UP&L
assumed operations. Likewise, the circumstances giving rise to
the claim for false imprisonment occurred after plaintiff was no
longer employed by Emery.
3

The Act contains comprehensive administrative procedures to
investigate
and
adjudicate
alleged
acts
of
employment
discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, national origin,
or handicap.
Initially, an aggrieved party files a charge of
discrimination with the Utah Antidiscrimination Division of the
Industrial Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1) (1953 & Supp.
1987) . The Commission gives the respondent notice of the charges
and allows the respondent to respond within ten days. Id. § 3435-7.1(3). The Commission assigns an investigator to look into the
4

exclusive remedy for all tort and contract claims rooted in
allegations of sexual discrimination and harassment under Utah
law.

In analyzing this claim, the scope and reach of the Utah

charge who, after first attempting to effectuate a settlement,
conducts an investigation of the allegations.
Id.
If the
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence supporting the charge,
he reports this to the Commission, which may then issue a "no
cause" finding. Id. § 34-35-7.1(4). The charging party may appeal
the "no cause" finding within 15 days, and request a formal .hearing
before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
If the Commission
determines that the matter shall be heard, notice of the hearing
is given to all parties. Id. If the Commission decides against
a formal hearing, the claimant may then file a complaint in state
district court to have the matter heard de novo. On the other
hand, if the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence to support
the charge, the Commission may then issue a "cause" finding. The
Commission, as a further means of effectuating a settlement, may
then request the parties to conduct conciliation discussions. Id.
§ 34-35-7.1(5). If that effort fails or the respondent declines
to participate, the respondent may appeal the "cause" finding
within 15 days, and request a formal hearing before an ALJ. If the
Commission decides against conducting a formal hearing, the
respondent may then petition the district court to hear the matter
de novo. Id. After the hearing, the ALJ will issue proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposed order to the
Commission.
Id. § 34-35-7.1(12).
The Commission may adopt,
reverse or modify the proposed Order, and if there has been a
violation of the Act, the Commission shall issue a "cease and
desist" order to the respondent and may order, among other things,
hiring, reinstatement, promotion, back pay, and the reimbursement
of costs and attorney's fees. Id. Either party has a right to
judicial review of the Commission's final order, which the district
court must hear de novo. Xd. § 34-35-8. These procedures provide
the exclusive remedy under Utah law for employment discrimination
based on race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or
handicap. Id. § 34-35-7.1(15). It should be noted that minor
changes have been made to the Act by way of amendment. However,
because the acts complained of here occurred prior to the effective
date of the amendment, January 1, 1988, and because statutes
generally are not given retrospective operation, see United States
v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,79 (1982), the court will not
apply the 1988 amended version of the Act.
5

statute will be discussed in the light of each of the asserted
pendent claims.
ANALYSIS
A.

Scope of Utah Statute
The Utah Antidiscrimination Act proscribes conduct

defined to be a "discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice."

Among other things, the Act provides that it is a

discriminatory or prohibited employment practice,
[f]or an employer to refuse to hire, or
promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate
any person, or to retaliate against, or
discriminate in matters of compensation or in
terms, privileges, and conditions of
employment against any person otherwise
qualified, because of race, color, sex, age
if the individual is 40 years of age or
older, religion, national origin, or
handicap. . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1)(a)(i) (1953 & Supp. 1987).
This language has been administratively interpreted to
include discrimination by means of sexual harassment.4

Under

Utah Antidiscrimination Division Regulation R486-l-l(g)
(1985). The Utah regulations turn to the guidelines promulgated
by the EEOC to define "sexual harassment":
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors,and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect
of
unreasonably
interfering
with
an
6

federal law, which provides guidance in interpretation of the
Utah statute,5 sexual harassment constitutes sexual
discrimination6 and may come in the form of sexual advances or
stereotyped and demeaning comments.7 This court takes the view
individualfs work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) 1988. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(14)
authorizes the promulgation of regulations "to govern, expedite,
and effectuate" the procedures under the Act.
Where state law interpretation of the Act is nonexistent
the Division's regulations expressly look to Federal law for
guidance. Utah Antidiscrimination Division Regulation R486-1-3
(1985).
Federal courts have held that sexual harassment constitutes
sexual discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. E.g. ,
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, — U . S . — , 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-07
(1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir.
1987); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755
F.2d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundv v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934, 943-46
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc.. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th
Cir. 1977); Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc.. 639 F.Supp. 1199,
1203 (D. Utah 1986).
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E.g~, Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.r 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th
Cir. 1987); Bundv v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
It may also take the form of sexual consideration as a quid pro quo
for job benefits. E.g., Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413; Jones v. Flagship
Int'l. 793 F.2d 714, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
1065 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir.
1982).
Additionally, an employee's termination, denial of
promotion, failure to hire, or other "concrete" adverse employment
decisions can form the basis of Title VII liability if such
decision results from the employee's refusal of a sexual advance.
Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d
599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson, 682 F.2d at 908; Craig v. Y & Y
7

that employer liability for sexual harassment is governed by
ordinary agency rules.8

Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of
Am. , 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Garber v. Saxon Business
Prods. , 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). Moreover, because Title VII
prohibits sex discrimination with respect to an employee's "terms,
conditions or privileges of employment," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
several courts have concluded that sexual harassment alone, even
absent a tangible job detriment, violates Title VII. See Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, — U . S . — , 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986),
Henson, 682 F.2d at 901; Bundv, 641 F.2d at 943-46. Bowen v.
Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1199, 1203 n.*8 (D. Utah
1986) (where alleged injury is hostile environment, sexual
harassment itself may be regarded as offensive per se and violative
of Title VII). In Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, the Supreme Court noted
that both the language of Title VII, which is not limited to
economic discrimination, and the EEOC guidelines show that Title
VII claims are not limited to economic injury. 106 S.Ct. at 240405. The Court also stated that as to the defense that plaintiff
voluntarily entered into the sexual relationship, the proper
question for the District Court was not whether the sexual
relations were voluntary but whether the alleged sexual advances
were "unwelcome." 106 S.Ct. at 2406.
* Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th
Cir. 1987). In Hicks, the Tenth Circuit rejected lack of actual
notice as an absolute defense to employer liability for sexual
harassment. Id. at 1418. Rather, relying upon the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2) (1958), the court held that an employer
could be held liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor if the
employer were negligent or reckless, and the supervisor purported
to act or to speak on behalf of the employer or was aided in
accomplishing the sexual harassment by the existence of the agency
relation. Id.
Federal courts have taken various approaches to employer
liability for the acts of their employees in sexually harassing
other employees. One approach adopts a rule of strict liability
relieving the plaintiff from the burden of demonstrating that
higher management knew or should have known, or otherwise
acquiesced, in the sexual harassment. This approach emphasizes the
EEOC guidelines which would impose licibility "where the employer
(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known
of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1988).
8

B.

Exclusivity of Remedy Under Utah Law
Defendants contend that all of plaintiff's pendent

claims are preempted by the exclusive remedy provision of the
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (1953 & Supp. 1987), which
provides:

"The procedures contained in this section and Section

34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination because of race, color, sex, age, religion, nation
[national] origin, or handicap."

Under the guidelines, an employer may even be liable for sexual
harassment by nonemployees in its work place under some conditions,
depending upon its degree of control over such nonemployees or
legal responsibility for their acts. Id. § 1604.11(e). See Horn,
755 F.2d at 606; Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th
Cir. 1979); see also Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943 (suggesting such a
standard by citing the EEOC guidelines and holding that an employer
is liable for discriminatory acts by a supervisor); Robson v. Eva's
Supermarket, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (employer
liable for supervisor's acquiescence in sexual harassment of
plaintiff by fellow employee).
A second approach adopting a narrower scope of employer
liability requires actual or constructive knowledge by the employer
if there has been no adverse employment consequence or if the
harassment was instigated by a fellow employee rather than by a
supervisor. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910; Barrett v. Omaha Natfl
Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1984); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). In Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, the Supreme
Court found that the court of appeals erred in finding that
employers were always strictly liable, but it held that the record
was not complete enough to justify a definitive ruling. 106 S.Ct.
at 2408. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens wrote
separately in Vinson to stress that they would extend the rule
applied in other Title VII cases, and hold that sexual harassment
by supervisory personnel, leading to a hostile work environment,
should be imputed to the employer for Title VII purposes. Id. at
2411.
9

Plaintiff argues that the Act fails to provide victims
of "discriminatory or prohibited employment practice[s]If with an
adequate avenue of relief.

In that regard, the Act provides that

following a hearing, if the administrative law judge ("ALT")
finds that there has been a violation of the Act he or she shall
issue,
an order requiring the respondent to cease
and desist from the unlawful discrimination
or prohibited employment practice and to take
such affirmative action, including, but not
limited to. hiring, reinstatement, or
upgrading of employees, with or without
backpay, the referring of applicants for
employment by any respondent labor
organization, the admission to or
continuation in enrollment in an
apprenticeship program, on-the-job training
program, or a vocational school, the posting
of notices, and making of reports as to the
manner of compliance, and the reimbursement
of costs and attorney's fees as in the
judgment of the commission effectuate the
purposes of this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(12) (1953 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).

Although the language "including, but not limited" may

be taken to suggest that the ALJ has authority to remedy all tort
and contract violations by any means he or she so desires, a more
reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the ALJ may
only award equitable relief that is of the same general nature as
the remedies explicitly provided for in the Act such as
injunctive relief, reinstatement and back pay.

10

Defendants argue that the Act provides an adequate
remedy for all of plaintiffs grievances because any person
"claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the [industrial]
commission" may commence an action for trial de novo in state
district court.

See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-8(3).9

Even if this

court accepted that argument, victims of intentional torts would
still have the additional burden of first pursuing administrative
remedies before obtaining adequate redress for wrongs
traditionally remedied within the judicial system.

An additional

concern is that there is no right to a jury trial at such a trial
de novo in the state district court.

Beehive Medical

Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 583 P.2d 53, 57
(Utah 1978).10

Furthermore, if this court were to hold that the

In University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 736
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987), the plaintiff prevailed before an ALJ on her
claims of age discrimination and retaliation.
The industrial
commission adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations
of the ALJ. The defendant sought de novo judicial review in the
district court pursuant to section 34-35-8. Following a proceeding
in which the district court reviewed the record created at the
hearing before the ALJ and at which the district judge heard
additional testimony, the district court set aside the order of the
commission. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the proper
procedure under the statute was a wholly de novo proceeding, and
that the district court was not required to accord deference to the
commission's factual findings or legal conclusions. Id. at 633.
In Beehive Medical Electronics, the court reasoned that
because section 34-35-8(6) provides that the "District Court shall
enter its findings of fact in such cases, the Legislature clearly
intended that the court, not a jury, be the fact finder in
antidiscrimination cases . . . " 583 P.2d at 57.
11

Act preempts plaintiff's intentional tort claims, then the Act's
180 day statute of limitations found in section 34-35-7,1(1)
would also apply to those claims, as to which plaintiff would
otherwise

be entitled to at least a one year limitation

period.11
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision of the
Act as only foreclosing those common law causes of action which
are based upon the very conduct which is necessary to prove
sexual harassment or sex discrimination unde>r the Act, namely,
conduct expressly prohibited by the Act or conduct satisfying all
the essential elements of a prima facie case.12 Where the
The claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment
have a one year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-1229(4), and the claim for fraud and deceit has a three year statute
of limitations, jld. § 78-12-26(3). However, the limitation period
with respect to the claims for intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress and invasion of privacy are not clearly
established. Section 78-12-25(3) provides a four year limitation
of actions for n[a]n action for relief not otherwise provided for
by law." There is no reason to believe that these causes of action
should not be subject to the four year statute. However, this
court declines to make a definitive ruling because resolution of
this issue is more appropriately left to the Utah Supreme Court.
This court has previously set forth the following elements
to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title
VII: "(1) the employee is a member of a protected group; (2) the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege
of employment (quid pro quo or created a hostile environment); and
(4) the employer is subject to liability based on agency
principles." Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1199,
1204 (D. Utah 1986) (citing Henson v.^ City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
903-05 (11th Cir. 1982); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct.
2399, 2405 (1986)). There is no reason why the same elements of
proof should not apply to a claim of sexual harassment under the
12

allegations in plaintiff's complaint demonstrate that plaintiff
has suffered a different injury than the statute covers, an
independent cause of action exists outside the Act.
Consequently, the alleged causes of action will be treated
seriatim to determine whether they are preempted by the Act.
1.

Breach of Employment Contract

Plaintiff's claim for breach of employment contract
essentially is a claim for alleged wrongful termination grounded
in sexual discrimination.

The Utah Act expressly prohibits an

employer from terminating any person because of sex or
discriminating against an employee "in terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment."

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1)(a)(i).

Because the breach of employment contract claim is based upon the
very discriminatory behavior prohibited by the Act, this court
concludes that the Utah Act preempts this cause of action.
As an alternative ground for granting defendants7
motion as to this claim, under Utah law as an "at will" employee,

Utah Act.
The first element may be established by a simple
stipulation of the employee's gender. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903;
Valley Camp. 639 F.Supp. at 1205. As to the second element,
unwelcome conduct is behavior which the employee did not solicit
or promote and the employee considered as undesirable or offensiveHenson, 682 F.2d at 903. The third element may be proved by
demonstrating either a concrete adverse employment decision, or a
hostile or utterly unpleasant work environment for members of one
sex. See Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2406-08. Finally, satisfying the
fourth element requires application of general respondeat superior
principles.
13

plaintiff has no right of action for breach of employment
contract.

See Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055, 1057-

58 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83,
84-85 (Utah 1986); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah
1979) .13
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the
general "at will" doctrine:
[I]n the absence of some further express or
implied stipulation as to the duration of the
employment or of a good consideration in
addition to the services contracted to be
rendered, the contract is no more than an
indefinite general hiring which is terminable
at the will of either party.
Bihlmaier. 603 P.2d at 792 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
Plaintiff does not assert that she was employed pursuant to a
formal employment contract. Instead, she asserts breach of an
implied contract as evidenced by the Emery Mining employee
handbook. Such an implied-in-fact contract, however, would require
conduct evidencing both parties1 mutual assent to be obligated by
the certain terms of their bargain.
Bruno, 747 P.2d at 1058
(citing Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976)). Here,
plaintiff neither negotiated with respect to the contents of the
manual, nor read or received the manual until after she was
employed. Unless an employee manual contains "specific contractual
terms" evidencing contractual intent, it is not transformed into
an employment contract for a definite term. See Zaccardi v. Zale
Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying New Mexico
law); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 754 F.2d 884, 886 (10th
Cir. 1985). See also Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488,
490-91 (10th Cir. 1984) (employment manual containing termination
and performance appraisal policies did not create a contract for
a definite term); Williams v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017,
1019-20 (10th Cir. 1983) (neither city-wide personnel manual nor
police department manual created property interests by means of an
implied contract under Utah law). Here, plaintiff relies upon the
handbook for what it says generally about compliance with
antidiscrimination laws rather than as a source of any commitment
to the duration of her employment. To satisfy the second Bihlmaier
exception, the employee "would have had to offer [his employer],
at its request, something more than what he was already obligated
14

2.

Bad Faith Discharge or Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff's claim for bad faith discharge or breach of
the implied covenant of good faith is grounded principally upon
the same factual allegations as her breach of contract claim.
Since this claim is based upon the very discriminatory conduct
prohibited by the Act, it too is preempted by Act.
As an alternative ground for granting defendants7
motion as to this claim, the court notes that Utah does not
recognize an action for breach of an implied duty of good faith
where, as here, the employment is terminable at will.

See Rose

v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d at 86.; Amos v. Corporation of
Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829-30 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd
in part on other grounds, — U . S . — , 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987).
3.

Tortious Discharge for Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff asks this court to follow the trend of other
courts that have determined that an exception to the at will
doctrine should be made so as to create a remedy in tort where
the reason for the termination of the employee violates a broader

to do under his employment agreement, not just a continuation of
the duties he was required to perform." Rose, 719 P.2d at 86.
See also Bruno, 747 P.2d at 1058. Because there is no allegation
here of consideration, beyond those services which were already
being performed, plaintiff cannot establish the second Bihlmaier
exception.
15

social and public policy.14

Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

See e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp,, 503 F.2d 108 (9th
Cir. 1974) (discharged because wages had been garnished where
federal statute made such discharge criminal); McNultv v. Borden,
Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discharged for opposition
to employer's price-fixing scheme); Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machines, Inc., 162 Cal.App.3d 241, 208 Cal.Rptr. 524
(1984) (discharged for romantic involvement with employee of
competitor); Delanev v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d
114 (1984) (discharged for refusal to sign false and potentially
defamatory statement); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.App.3d
443, 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 (1980) (discharged for refusal to help
market a drug that employee believed to be hazardous); Brown v.
Transcon, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (discharged for filing
workers 1 compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d
512 (1975) (discharged for performing jury duty); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. . 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharged for
refusing to go out with supervisor); Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co. . 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharged for filing
worker's
compensation
claim);
Petermann
v.
International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)
(discharged for refusal to commit perjury).
But cf. Amos v.
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829-30 (D. Utah
1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, — U . S . — , 107 S.Ct. 2862
(1987) (refusing to recognize cause of action for wrongful
discharge of at will employee in violation of public policy against
religious discrimination); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27
(D. Mass. 1984) (refusing to recognize cause of action for
discharge
in
violation
of
public
policy
against
age
discrimination); Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F.Supp.
242 (N.D. 111. 1983) (discharge of at will employee who had
retained attorney in dispute with employer regarding payment of
wages did not violate public policy, since employee had no standing
to assert rights he claimed); Borsen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526
F.Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff f d, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984)
(employer's attempts to rid itself of troublesome employee together
with its failure to follow its own evaluation policies did not
constitute wrongful discharge in violation of public policy);
Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (group insurance salesmen who were discharged for refusal to
relinquish accrued right to be paid for credits earned and
accumulated during employment failed to state claim for wrongful
discharge based on public policy); McClunev v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co. , 489 F.Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (refusing to recognize
cause of action for bad faith discharge or discharge in violation
of public policy against sex discrimination); Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 438 F.Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no cause of action for
16

she should be allowed recovery in tort because her discharge
allegedly was based on sex discrimination, unfair labor practices
and criminal conduct, all of which violate fundamental public
policies of the State of Utah.

However, the Utah Supreme Court

has not adopted such a public policy exception, and this court
declines to predict whether it will do so.
4.

Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress

Plaintiff's assertions of intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress go beyond the discriminatory
conduct prohibited by the Utah Act. As pleaded, the alleged
conduct15 constitutes "outrageous behavior"16 for which the Utah
violation of public policy against age discrimination or for breach
of implied contract).
Plaintiff alleges that Rajski required her "to remain
seated in a confined room for lengthy periods of time while he
verbally and emotionally abused and threatened her." Complaint,
C-87-0659G, at 5 56.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that
" [defendants1 conduct was willful, malicious, and oppressive and
intentionally . . . caused severe emotional distress and physical
pain and suffering to plaintiff through intolerable and outrageous
conduct." Id.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d, in
pertinent part states:
Liability has been found only where the conduct
has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse
17

Supreme Court recognizes a cause of action, which may be based
upon either intentional17 or negligent conduct.18
5.

Invasion of Privacy

Assuming this cause of action exists in Utah, it is not
preempted by the Utah Act because it does not constitute the very
discriminatory behavior prohibited by the Act.

Such a tort,

however, has not yet been judicially recognized in Utah.
Nevertheless, given the fact that "rights of privacy are .
recognized in virtually all jurisdictions," W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed. 1984), there is
no reason to assume that the Utah Supreme Court would not

his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a cause of
action for emotional distress may be based upon intentional
conduct. Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah
1987). Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (1961).
At the time this matter was argued, defendants asserted
that Utah does not recognize a cause of action for emotional
distress may not be based upon mere negligence, citing Reiser v.
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982) and Scimms v. Eccles, 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961)). Since that time, however,
the Utah Supreme Court has departed from the approach taken in
Reiser and Samms, and expressly recognized that "a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be maintained"
in Utah. Johnson v. Rogers, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah August
25, 1988). Although the Court overviewed the various analytical
approaches for implementing such a cause of action, it declined to
adopt a definitive legal standard by which the tort is to be
defined. See id. at 13 (Zimmerman, J. concurring).
18

recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy if presented
with an appropriate factual situation.

It is clear that the

essential elements19 of this tort are separate and distinct from
the elements of proof for a claim of sexual harassment under the
Utah Act.

Accordingly, such is not preempted by the Utah Act.
In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that Rajski

repeatedly called her at home, followed her during off-work
hours, appeared uninvited at her home, and delivered sexually
suggestive notes and clothing to her.

It is sufficient for

purposes of this Motion to find that such allegations could be a
violation of plaintiff's right of privacy, constituting a tort
for which she may recover damages to the extent that it can be
proved.
6.

Assault and Battery

In support of her claim for assault and battery,

The tort of privacy as it has developed includes protection
of an individual's personality as well as protection of solitude.
In all, the tort includes the following four kinds of wrongs: (1)
appropriation by defendant of plaintiff's picture or name for
defendant's commercial advantage; (2) intrusion by defendant upon
plaintiff's affairs or seclusion; (3) publication by defendant of
facts which place the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) public
disclosure of private facts about plaintiff by defendant. W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra. at § 117. The type of invasion of
privacy applicable to this case falls within the intrusion
category, a tort which the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B
articulates as follows:
"One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for intrusion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."
19

plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions Rajski intended to,
and did touch her body in an offensive manner without her
consent, and that as a result, she suffered both physical and
emotional injuries.
«

Complaint, C-87-0659G, at 55 64, 67. One
.

•

t

20

can be subject to liability to another for assault

•

if:

"(a) he

acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put
in such imminent apprehension."
21.

Restatement (Second) of Torts §

A person can be subject to liability for battery21 if: the

requirements of (a) above are met, and "(b) a harmful contact
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results."
Id. at § 13; see also Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d
839 (1970).

Because the elements of proof for both of these

torts differ dramatically from the elements for a claim of sexual
harassment under the Act, the court finds that the Act does not
preempt these causes of action.
7.

False Imprisonment

Assault is a tort which protects a plaintiff's "interest
in freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with
the person . . . " W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 10 at 43.
Battery is the "interest in freedom from intentional and
unpermitted contacts with the plaintiff's person . . . " w. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra, § 9 at 39.
20

Under Utah law, the tort of false imprisonment

is

defined as a nonconsensual, intentional detention or restraint of
another person.

State v. Pass, 30 Utah 2d 197, 515 P.2d 612, 613

(1973); Mildon v. Bvbee. 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458, 459
(1962); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35; W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra, § 11. A person may be falsely imprisoned "by
actual imprisonment, or by interference or restraint upon his
freedom of movement imposed by force or threats."
at 612.

Pass, -515 P.2d

It is abundantly clear that the Act does not preempt

this cause of action because the theoretical basis for the two
claims are separate and distinct.
8.

Failure to Adequately Train, Supervise or Control

The essence of this alleged cause of action is that

In support of her false imprisonment claim, plaintiff
alleges that:
69. Rajski, on October 10, 1986, intended
to, and did cause a false imprisonment or
unlawful detention of Plaintiff by his
detention or restraint of Plaintiff's person
in an unlawful manner, against her will and
without her consent.
70. Additionally, on [sic] or about July
15, 1986, Rajski intended to, and did cause a
false imprisonment or unlawful detention of
Plaintiff by his detention or restraint of
Plaintiff in confined quarters during late
night hours, while he subjected Plaintiff to
lengthy verbal and emotional assaults, all in
an unlawful manner against Plaintiff's will and
without her consent.
Complaint, C-87-0659G, at 55 69, 70.
21

employers have an obligation to provide a reasonable amount of
training to employees so as to allow them to carry out their
duties without endangering themselves, fellow workers, or third
persons.

See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213.

With respect

to this claim, plaintiff complains primarily that Emery Mining
and Up&L failed adequately to train and supervise Rajski as to
nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, and additionally as to the
unlawful and prohibited practice of sexual harassment.

Despite

the lack of Utah law to give the court guidance on this theory,
the court believes that general negligence concepts should apply.
See 4d #

Because failure to supervise may encompass more than

acts defined to be "discriminatory or prohibited employment
practices" under the Utah Act, the court concludes that the Act
does not preempt this cause of action.
9.

Fraud and Deceit

As with plaintiff's other intentional tort claims, it
is evident that her claim for fraud and deceit23 is not preempted
In order to establish a prima facie case of fraud or deceit
under Utah law, the following elements must be proven:
(1)
(2)
material
(3)
(4)

[t]hat a representation was made;
concerning a presently
existing
fact;
which was false;
which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representations;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it;
22

by the Utah Act.

Plaintiff asserts that Rajski and UP&L

fraudulently induced her to sign a "release" document purporting
to release UP&L and its officers from liability.

The court

concludes that plaintiff has adequately alleged all essential
elements for a claims of fraudulent misrepresentation.
The stipulation of counsel in which even conclusory and
apparently unsubstantiated allegations were deemed established
for purposes of this motion requires denial of the corporate
defendants motion to dismiss as to several causes of action at
this time.24
(6)
that
the
other
party,
acting
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his injury and damage.
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Parrishf 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d
273, 274-75 (1952)); see also Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson,
610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d
293, 294 (Utah 1980); Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah
1978) .
Whether Emery Mining and UP&L would be liable for
intentional torts allegedly committed by Rajski presents a fact
bound inquiry.
The court notes that in Utah principles of
respondent superior define the scope of employer liability for the
intentional torts of its employees. An employer is liable for an
employee's intentional torts committed during the course of
employment where either the acts are committed in furtherance of
the employer's interests, or the employment is such that the use
of force could be contemplated in its accomplishment. Barney v.
Jewel Tea Co. , 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943). An employer
may be liable for damages resulting from an assault and battery
committed by an employee, even though not in furtherance of the
employer's interests, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
employer was negligent in employing or retaining the employee under

23

For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes
that summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants as
to plaintiff's claims for breach of employment contract, bad
faith discharge, and tortious discharge for violation of public
policy. Summary judgment is denied as to plciintiff's claims for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and
fraud and deceit.25

Counsel for defendant Raj ski is directed to

prepare a form of Order consistent with the memorandum decision
and order after first complying with Local Rule 13(e).

circumstances that such assault and battery was reasonably
foreseeable. Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d
910, 911 (1963).
Other than conclusory allegations in her
complaint that Rajski was an agent of Emery Mining and UP&L, who
at all relevant times allegedly was acting within the scope of his
employment, plaintiff has failed to set forth a factual foundation
to support liability against Emery Mining & UP&L. The court is
nevertheless satisfied that such allegations can be read as
assertions that the acts were committed in furtherance of the
interest of Emery Mining and UP&L.
See Barney, 139 P. 2d at
879.Accordingly, assuming the bare allegations of the complaint as
true, the motions must be denied at this time.
UP&L argues in its reply memorandum that plaintiff's claims
are barred by the workers' compensation provisions of the Utah
Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-45, 60 (1953 & Supp. 1987).
However, plaintiff did not raise this issue in her opposition
memorandum.
Because Local Rule 5(e) provides that "reply
memorandum must be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the
memorandum opposing the motion," the court will not address the
workers' compensation issue at this time.
24

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 'QdtobHr
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